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THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE: BASTION
OF CONGRESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OR
HIAVEN FOR CORRUPTION?
CRAIG M. BRADLEYt
As the popular concern gradually shifts away from the problem of
a corrupt presidency to the more familiar problem of the corrupt con-
gressman, it seems appropriate to reconsider the principles of congres-
sional privilege. While the constitutionally guaranteed congressional
privileges, such as the freedom of speech or debate, may tend to protect
Congress from overreaching by the executive, they may also have the
effect of shielding corrupt congressmen from legitimate efforts to inves-
tigate and prosecute their transgressions. Indeed, in the investigation
of the Korean corruption of the United States Congress the investiga-
tive efforts of the Justice Department were frequently impaired and
trial preparation hampered because many, if not most, of the "official
acts" that must be proven to make a case under the federal bribery
statute' are also "legislative Acts" under the speech or debate clause of
the Constitution.2 According to the courts, these "acts" cannot be in-
troduced into evidence (or made the subject of a subpoena or grand
jury inquiry) despite the express inclusion of congressmen in the cover-
age of the bribery statute.' Further, the clause has been construed to
prohibit evidence of the motivations for legislative acts, as well as the
acts themselves, and one court has even extended the coverage of the
t Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina; A.B. 1967, The Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1970, The University of Virginia. From July 1976
to July 1978, the author served as a Senior Trial Attorney with the Criminal Division of the
United States Department of Justice investigating the "Koreagate" bribery scandal. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) ("Bribery of public officials and witnesses"). Section 201(c)
provides:
"Whoever, being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or
indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, ... receives, or agrees to receive anything of value
...in return for.
(1) being influenced in his performance of any official act... [shall be guilty of
an offense]."
2. "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House [Senators and Representatives] shall not be
questioned in any other Place." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 3.
3. See text accompanying notes 125-151 infra.
4. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 183 (1966).
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clause to bar proof of the motivations for "purported" legislative acts.5
It is the purpose of this article to examine the historical back-
ground of the congressional privilege of free speech and debate and to
determine whether the scope given the privilege by the courts has been
appropriate in light of that background. Far from having interpreted
the clause too narrowly, as some commentators have argued,6 the
courts of the United States have taken too broad a view of the coverage
of the clause and, in doing so, have created a serious impediment to the
successful investigation and prosecution of congressional corruption.
The concept of congressional privilege finds its roots in five hun-
dred years of struggle between the Crown and Parliaments in England.
By the time the American Constitution was ratified in 1789, Parliament
had gained the upper hand,7 and its privileges were not only extensive,'
but largely unfettered by formal definition.9 At the Constitutional
Convention, the delegates considered a proposal of Mr. Pinckney's to
5. United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213, 224-26 (4th Cir. 1973) (excluding evidence of
congressman's contact with executive branch officials because it was "purportedly" a legislative
act), discussed in note 150 infra.
6. See, ag., Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1146 (1973). This article is by no means entirely at loggerheads with the
excellent exposition offered by Messrs. Reinstein and Silvergiate since they recognize, id. at 1158,
that there are special problems in the area of congressional bribery. See also Note, The Bribed
Congressman's Immunity From Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 348 (1965). Nevertheless, while
there are areas of agreement, the basic conclusions of this article on the correct application of the
speech or debate clause to prosecutions under the federal bribery statute are contrary to theirs.
See also Celia, The Doctrine ofLegislative Privilege of Speech or Debate" The New Interpretation as
a Threat to Legislative Coequality, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1019 (1974); Ervin, The Graveland Brew-
ster Caes:.AnAssault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. Rav. 175 (1973); Kaye, Congres-
sional Papers, Judicial Subpoenas, and the Constitution, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 523 (1977).
7. See 2 T. ERSKINE MAY, THE CONSTITurioNAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 364 (4th ed. 1912)
(n.p.n.d.).
8. See text accompanying notes 82-89 infra.
9. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *164.
The privileges of parliament are likewise very large and indefinite .... [When a ques-
tion was put to the courts concerning the scope of the privileges it was declared that] "the
justices should [not] in any wise determine the privileges of the high court of parliament.
For it is so high and mighty in its nature, that it may make law: and that which is law, it
may make no law: and the determination and knowledge of that privilege belongs to the
lords of parliament, and not to the justices." Privilege of parliament was principally
established, in order to protect its members, not only from being molested by their fel-
low-subjects, but also more especially from being oppressed by the power of the Crown.
If therefore all the privileges of parliament were once to be set down and ascertained,
and no privilege to be allowed but what was so defined and determined, it were easy for
the executive power to devise some new case, not within the line of privilege, and under
the pretence thereof to harass any refractory member and violate the freedom of parlia-
ment. The dignity and independence of the two houses are therefore in great measure
preserved by keeping their privileges indefinite.
Id. Blackstone went on to point out that one of the more "notorious" of the privileges, the privi-
lege of speech, had been enacted into law. Id. (citing An Act declareing the Rights and Liberties
of the Subject and Seteing the Succession of the Crowne, 1688, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 22).
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make Congress the judge of its own privileges, as in the British sys-
tem,'0 but the proposal was rejected, apparently because of the strong
opposition of Madison, who felt that it was necessary to define the
scope of congressional privilege narrowly.1
Consequently, what must be thought to be the full extent of the
congressional privilege was set forth in three clauses of the Constitu-
tion:12 the publication clause;13 the immunity from arrest clause;' 4 and
the speech or debate clause.' 5 Of these, only the speech or debate
clause ever has been, or could appropriately be, invoked to protect a
congressman from criminal prosecution.' 6 Accordingly, this article will
be limited to the background of the speech or debate clause and the
manner in which that clause has been interpreted by the courts.
I. HISTORY
While the history of the clause has been discussed in some detail in
prior articles,'7 there are certain facets of the history that require fur-
ther elaboration. The most definite aspect of the early development of
10. See note 9 supra.
11. The clause in Pinckney's draft declared that "[e]ach House shall be the judge of its own
privileges, and shall have authority to punish by imprisonment every person violating the same."
3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1365 (J. & H.G. Langley ed. 1841) (containing Madison's
reports on debates of Federal Constitutional Convention). For Madison's objections to this pro-
posal, see id. at 1285-86, 1493-94. See note 92 infra. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 182, 189 (1880) (House of Representatives has authority to punish its own members for disor-
derly conduct, to decide contested elections, and to determine qualifications of its members, to
impeach, to fine or imprison a contumacious witness, but has no generalpower to punish for
contempt).
12. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 200-05 (1890). In Congressional Papers, Judicial
Subpoenas andthe Constitution, supra note 6, Professor Kaye presents a thorough discussion of all
aspects of constitutionally mandated congressional privileges, including the inappropriateness of a
claim under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cL 2, which pertains to Congress' rulemaking and disciplinary
power to resist a judicial subpoena for congressional papers.
13. "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their judgment require secrecy. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 5, cL. 3.
14. "[Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of
the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same . Id. § 6, cl. 1.
15. "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House [Senators and Representatives] shall not be
questioned in any other Place." Id. cl. 3.
16. The immunity from arrest clause is, by its terms, inapplicable to cases involving "Trea-
son, Felony and Breach of the Peace," id. cl. 1, and any doubt about its inapplicability as a shield
from criminal prosecution was resolved by the Supreme Court in Williamson v. United States, 207
U.S. 425 (1908).
The publication clause has never been invoked to shield a congressman from a subpoena of
congressional papers, and Professor Kaye's conclusion that the clause provides no predicate for
congressional resistance to judicial subpoena is certainly correct. Kaye, supra note 6, at 536.
17. See Cella, supra note 6; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1120-44.
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the clause was that its scope was most indefinite. 18 Each definition of
the scope of the clause depended not only upon who between the
Crown and Parliament was expounding the privilege, but also upon
which of those contending parties had the upper hand at that particular
time. 19 Thus, no one statement of the scope of the parliamentary privi-
lege of free speech may be taken as authoritative since it more likely
reflects the attitude or aspirations of the declarant than it does any set-
tled rule of law or custom.
What is now considered to be Parliament's earliest assertion of the
parliamentary privilege of free speech occurred in Strode's Case in
1512.20 Strode, a member of Parliament, was the author of a bill to
regulate certain abuses in the tin mines in Cornwall. For this, he was
prosecuted, fined and imprisoned by the Stannary Court.2' On Strode's
petition, Parliament passed an act annulling the judgment and provid-
ing that any legal proceeding that might be brought against the mem-
bers of the present or any future Parliament "for any bill, spekyng,
reasonyng, or declaryng of any matter or matters concerning the Parlia-
ment" shall be utterly void.22 However, despite the "flood of indignant
18. The scope of the clause remained indefinite well into the nineteenth century. C. WiTTKE,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 127 (1921).
19. For example, in 1451 one Yonge was imprisoned because he proposed to Parliament that
the Duke of York should be declared heir to the crown. Fortunately for Yonge, York soon gained
control of the government, and Yonge petitioned for his release. He urged that
"by the olde liberte and freedom of the Commyns of this Lande had, enjoyed and pre-
scribed, from the tyme that no mynd is, [all members] ought to have theire fredom to
speke and sey in the Hous of their assemble, as to theym is thought convenyent or rea-
sonable, withoute eny maner chalange, charge or pynycion therefore."
Neale, The Commons Privilege ofFree Speech in Parliament, in TUDOR STUDIES 257, 264-65 (R.
Seton-Watson ed. 1924) (quoting 5 ROT. PARL. 337a (remarks of Yonge, M.P.)).
As Neale points out, it is hard to say how much more than a personal opinion was Yonge's
definition of free speech in Parliament. "Certainly it cannot be taken at its face value; and it
would be absurd, considering Yonge's connection with party politics, to urge that the favourable
answer of the government was an implicit recognition of his definition." Id.
20. Strode's Case, discussed in T. PLUCKNETr, TASWELL-LANGMEAD'S ENGLISH CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY 247-49 (11th ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD]. Earlier
historians thought the case of Thomas Haxey in 1397 was the first case dealing with this Parlia-
mentary privilege, see, eg., 1 W. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 166-67
(5th ed. 1922), but this view has been rejected by later historians because Haxey, though he made
remarks critical of the King in Parliament, was not a member of that body. Furthermore, it ap-
pears that the reversal of his conviction may have been attributable to procedural error rather
than to any claim of Parliamentary free speech. Consequently, Haxey's arrest by Richard II for
remarks made in Parliament and the subsequent nullification of that action by Henry IV have
little bearing on the question of Parliamentary privilege. Neale, supra note 19, at 259-60. See also
C. WrrITKE, supra note 18, at 23-24.
21. "The court for the Stannaries of Cornwall and Devon is a court of special jurisdiction
...in derogation from the general jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Law, for the local
redress of private wrongs." T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 248 n.95.
22. 4 Henry VIII, c. 8 (1512), quoted in T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 249.
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verbiage,"23 the principle espoused in this case had nothing to do with
the parliamentary privilege of free speech vis-h-vis the Crown. It was
simply an assertion of the rather obvious principle that "members [of
Parliament] were not indictable in petty tribunals for their actions in
Parliament."'24
By 154225 the traditional speaker's petition to the King or Queen
at the commencement of Parliament included an unelaborated request
for freedom of speech.26 It is one thing, however, to assert a right in
general terms and quite another to stand up for that right against an
angry sovereign.' Indeed, in the cases of Story in the reign of Edward
VI (1547 to 1553) and Copley in the reign of Mary (1553 to 1558), both
of whom made remarks critical of the Crown, the Commons did not
wait for royal wrath to fall on them, but imprisoned the malefactors
and then petitioned the Crown for mercy.2"
By the accession of Elizabeth in 1558, both the power of Parlia-
ment and the reformation movement had grown to the point that the
divine right of the sovereign could be questioned,29 and in that year the
Commons began to question Elizabeth about the succession.30 When
23. See T. TAsWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 249. In 1667, after a century and a half of
debate over its application, Strode's Act was declared to be a general law protecting all members
of Parliament. Id. at 378 n.55.
24. Id. at 249. Neale expands upon the impact of Strode's Case: "I need hardly point out
that Strode's case has no concern with the relations of the crown and the commons. The act
concerning him asserts the obvious principle that an inferior court cannot punish members of a
superior court for their actions in that court." Neale, supra note 19, at 270 n.45. See also C.
MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY 220-22 (1910).
25. Neale argues that these requests were evident even before 1542. Neale, supra note 19, at
267.
26. "Ut in dicendis sententlis quivis libere et impune eloqui posset quid animi haberet et
quid consilii." 1 H.L. JOUR. 167, quotedin T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 247 n.94.
27. In the words of Taswell-Langmead, Parliament had "framed a form of words which em-
bodied a principle. . . [but] it still remained for them to translate that claim into the peaceful
enjoyment of a privilege." T. TASWELL LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 247.
As Neale points out in his discussion of Parliamentary privilege during the reign of Henry
VIII (1509-1547), "Argument might be a little one-sided in an age familiar with the saying that the
wrath of the prince is death and familiar too with its truth." Neale, supra note 19, at 269-70. This
is probably the reason why there is no evidence of any direct conflict between Parliament and
Henry VIII on the issue of free speech. Id. at 270. The members presumably preferred watching
their tongues to losing their heads.
28. Neale, supra note 19, at 272; T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 322. Some schol-
ars have considered these cases an assertion by Parliament of its right to "punish members for
violations of its rules of order," 2 H. TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH CON-
STITUTION 203 (4th ed. 1896). Eg., id. While these cases are indeed the root of that power, it
seems clear that Parliament's intent at the time was less that of a bold explorer, establishing new
beachheads of privilege, than that of a cowardly dog which, having inadvertently bitten its master,
cringes at his feet, hoping to avoid the whip.
29. Neale, supra note 19, at 276-77.
30. C. WrrTTE, supra note 18, at 26.
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the Queen declined to pronounce between the conflicting claimants to
the throne, a joint petition from both houses was presented to her in
1566 urging resolution of the issue, and bold speeches were made in
Parliament urging that she either be compelled to marry or that a suc-
cessor be declared against her will.3 1 This "grated hard on the Queen's
royal prerogative" and she summoned a number of members before
her and delivered "a smart reproof, in which, however, she mixed some
sweetness with majesty. '32 One Paul Wentworth, a member of Parlia-
ment, questioned whether the Queen's command to stop discussing
such matters was not against their liberties and privilege. The House of
Commons began to debate this question, and finally, after several days,
the Queen gave way and informed the speaker that she revoked the
command and inhibition.33
The Queen was not defeated, however. She did not call another
Parliament for five years, a and when she did, the response to the
speaker's usual petition was that "her majesty having Experience of
late of some disorder, and certain Offences which though they were not
punished, yet were they Offences still. . therefore said, they should
do well to meddle with no matters of State, but such as should be pro-
pounded unto them."35 While such commandments seem to have si-
lenced Paul Wentworth, they spurred his brother Peter on to greater
action. In the 1575 session of Parliament, Peter complained that such
messages infringed the fundamental rights of the Commons and should
be "Buried in Hell."3 6 Fearing the Queen's wrath, the Commons
stopped him in mid-speech and committed him to the Tower of
London where he remained until the Queen informed the Commons
that she had "remitted" her displeasure against him. 7
Twelve years later, the irrepressible Peter Wentworth took the
floor again to ask "whether this House be not a place for any member
freely and without controlment of any person, or danger of laws, by bill
or speech, to alter any of the griefs of the commonwealth whatso-
ever?"' 38 The answer, obviously, was a resounding "No," and he was
31. T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 312; C. WrrrKF, supra note 18, at 26.
32. 1 W. COBBErr, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 715-16 (London 1806).
33. T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 313.
34. Id.
35. S. D'EwEs, JOURNAL OF ALL THE PARLIAMENTS DURING THE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZA-
BETH 141-42 (London 1682).
36. Id. at 236-41.
37. T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 315.
38. S. D'EwEs, supra note 35, at 411.
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again packed off to the Tower. Elizabeth's view of the freedom of
speech in Parliament was set forth very clearly in the Queen's response
to the speaker's petition in 1593: "Privilege of speech is granted, but
you must know what privilege you have; not to speak every one what
he listeth, or what cometh into his brain to utter that; but your privilege
is 'Ay' or 'no.' " 3 9 Though Elizabeth seems to have had the last word
on the matter in her reign, Parliament had at least established a beach-
head from which it would gain absolute freedom of speech in less than
a century.
The battle was quickly joined. In the November 1606 session of
Parliament, James I proposed free trade with Scotland. Sir Christopher
Pigott denounced the Scots as "beggars, rebels, and traitors."4 The
King informed the Commons that he was upset with them for not cut-
ting Pigott off before such remarks became public. After duly deter-
mining that Pigott could not be called into question elsewhere for his
remarks, the House of Commons obligingly expelled and imprisoned
him.4 1
Rather than suffer the slings and arrows of Parliament, James was
content to get along without appropriations for ten years.42 In 1621,
however, James was compelled by economic necessity to reconvene
Parliament. While willing to grant the King a subsidy, Parliament first
wanted to take up the proposed marriage of the Prince of Wales and
the Infanta of Spain. James looked upon the marriage as a means to
collect a handsome dowry (and hence limit his dependence on Parlia-
ment for funds), but the Commons saw the marriage as a popish plot to
spread the influence of Catholicism. James ordered the Commons to
refrain from meddling in the "mysteries of state" and informed them
that he felt "very free and able to punish any man's misdemeanors in
39. Id. at 460, quoted i T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 316. While Taswell-
Langmead purports to have drawn this quote from D'Ewes, the author's version of D'Ewes'
Journal is different, and Neale, supra note 19, quotes a third version of the same statement. All
versions convey the same thought, however.
Peter Wentworth was undeterred by the Queen's response and submitted a petition concern-
ing the succession, whereupon he was called before the Privy Council and again committed to theTower. S. D'Ewras, supra note 35, at 470, citedin T. TAsWELL-LANGMEd, supra note 20, at 316.
40. 2 H. TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 227 (citing 1 H.C. JoUR. 333).
41. Id. (citing 1 H.C. JOUR. 335).
42. From 1610 to 1614 no Parliament was convened. On April 5, 1614, the so-called "addled
Parliament" was convened, but when it failed to pass a single bill during the ensuing two months,
it was dissolved. See T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 346; 2 H. TAYLOR, supra note 28,
at 237-38.
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parliament, as well during their sitting as after."4 3 The Commons re-
sponded with a strong but respectful justification of their conduct and
adverted to their "ancient and undoubted right" to freedom of
speech.4 James replied that he had no intention of limiting their free-
dom of speech, but pointed out that he could not
allow of the style, calling it your ancient and undoubted right [when
actually it] were derived from the grace and permission of our ances-
tors and us [for most of them grow from precedents, which shows
rather a toleration then an inheritance] yet we are pleased to give you
our royal assurance that as long as -you contain yourself within the
limits of your duty we will be as careful to maintain and preserve
your lawful liberties as any of our predecessors were. . .; so as your
house shall only have need to beware to trench upon the prerogative
of the Crown, which would enforce us, or any just king, to retrench
them of their privileges.45
The Commons could not allow this to go unanswered. On Decem-
ber 18, 1621, they recorded their historic protestation, reasserting that
their privileges were their "ancient and undoubted birthright" and
that in the handling and proceeding of those businesses, every mem-
ber of the House of Parliament hath, and of right ought to have,
freedom of speech to propound, treat, reason, and bring to conclu-
sion, the same. ... And that every member of the said House hath
like freedom from all impeachment, imprisonment and molestation
(other than by censure of the House itself), for or concerning any
speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any matter or matters, touching
the parliament, or parliament business."
The King was so outraged by this that he sent for the Common's Jour-
nal, tore out the report, and declared the protestation "invalid, an-
nulled, void, and of no effect." He then dissolved Parliament and
committed the ringleaders to prison or, in some cases, accomplished the
same end by appointing them royal commissioners to Ireland.47 Two
years later, when the marriage had fallen through, James found it nec-
essary to reconvene Parliament in order to prosecute a war with Spain.
In a spirit of conciliation, he allowed Parliament to examine the details
43. W. COBBETT, supra note 32, 1326-27; T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 356-57.
44. G. PROTHERO, SELECT STATUTES AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRA-
TIVE OF THE REIGNS OF ELIZABETH AND JAMES 1311 (1894).
45. Id. at 312.
46. 1 H.C. JOUR. 688, quoted in T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 357-58. This
protestation is particularly noteworthy since it is cited by Jefferson in his Manual as one of the few
references for his understanding of the scope of the speech or debate clause of the Constitution. T.
JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 20 (Philadelphia 1853) (n.p.n.d.).
47. C. WrrrKE, supra note 18, at 29; T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 358; 2 H.
TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 249.
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of the negotiations with Spain, and they in turn appropriated the re-
quested funds. James prorogued Parliament on relatively good terms
in October 1624, and died the next year.48
The advent of Charles I saw new conflicts with the Puritan-con-
trolled Parliament, initially over speeches critical of the royal favorite,
the Duke of Buckingham,49 but soon over more fundamental issues of
civil liberties. This latter conflict led to the famous Petition of Right in
1628, which in essence forbade imprisonment without due process of
law, taxation without representation, and the billeting of soldiers
against the will of householders."
Charles immediately proceeded to violate the spirit, if not the let-
ter, of the Petition by raising customs duties and seizing the goods of
merchants who refused to pay. Since one of these merchants (one
Rolle) was also a member of Parliament, an issue of parliamentary
privilege was raised." The King did not want this issue discussed and
ordered the Speaker to adjourn the House. When the Speaker at-
tempted to rise from his chair, however, he was thrust back in it by
Messrs. Holles and Valentine while Sir John Eliot delivered a speech
critical of the King's policies. The King ordered the three offenders
imprisoned, and an information was filed against them in the King's
Bench. 2 The accused pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court, declaring
that "words spoken in Parliament, which is a superior court, cannot be
questioned in this court, which is inferior."53 This plea was rejected,
and the defendants were incarcerated and fined.54
48. 2 H. TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 250-51.
49. Id. at 260.
50. T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 367. When Charles convened his third Parlia-
ment in 1628 in order to demand funds for the war with Spain, the Commons' response, given by
Sir Thomas Wentworth, was that they had come together to vindicate the "ancient laws made by
our ancestors." Id. They then passed The Petition of Right. 3 Car. 1, c. 1 (1628), reprinted in T.
TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra, at 370-72. After expressing reservations and attempting to avoid
direct approval, Charles was constrained to assent to the Petition. T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra
at 370.
51. T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 373. Parliamentary privilege was held to pro-
tect not only the person but the goods of members of Parliament from arrest. Id.
52. Id. at 377.
53. Proceedings Against Sir John Eliot, 3 How. ST. TR. 293, 296 (1629). A similar statement
had been made by the Commons in connection with Sandy's Case in 1621. G. PROTHERO, supra
note 44, at 314.
54. The defendants were charged with conspiracy and riot, and the court held that these
offenses must be punishable in the court of King's Bench because otherwise they might go unpun-
ished (since a future Parliament could not take note of what had occurred in a prior Parliament).
Proceedings Against Sir John Eliot, 3 How. ST. TR. 293, 307 (1629). The court also held that the
freedom of speech did not extend to speaking seditiously or behaving in a disorderly manner. 6
W. HOLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENLISH LAW 97, 269 (3d ed. 1923).
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For the next eleven years Charles did not convene Parliament, and
the Commons were, therefore, unable to state their violent opposition
to this action. Finally, facing a rebellion in Scotland over certain litur-
gical questions, Charles was forced to reconvene Parliament on April
13, 1640. Parliament, however, refused to act until redress was given
for the breach of privilege in the case of Eliot, Holles and Valentine
and, its predecessor, Rolle's Case. Consequently, Parliament was dis-
solved after three weeks.5" On November 13, 1640, Charles was forced
to summon the "Long Parliament," which, before it was adjourned,
would forever secure the ascendency of Parliament and respect for its
privileges by executing the King and taking over the government.56
Parliament's dominance was thus established, but the bounds of its
privileges, including the privilege of free speech, were not yet fixed. On
November 12, 1667, the Commons declared Strode's Act a general law
affirming the "ancient and necessary rights and privileges of Parlia-
ment," 57 and on November 23, they voided the judgment against Eliot,
Holles and Valentine. Subsequently, on a writ of error brought by Hol-
les, the House of Lords reversed the judgment of the King's Bench.58
The final victory for parliamentary privilege occured after the
revolution of 1688, during the reign of William and Mary, when Parlia-
ment passed the Bill of Rights.5 9 In addition to settling various issues
of civil liberties that had been in contention with the Stuarts, it de-
clared "that the freedome of speech and debates or proceedings in Par-
lyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place
out of Parlyament." Since this obviously was the precurser of the
speech or debate clause in the United States Constitution, it is impor-
tant to examine carefully any contemporaneous events that may shed
light on its meaning. Thus, Reinstein and Silverglate rightly turn to the
Proceedings Against Sir William Williams6 since, as they note, the
Commons declared that the free speech clause was "put in for the sake
of... Sir William Williams, who was punished out of Parliament for
what he had done in Parliament."62
55. Thus, this Parliament became known as the "Short Parliament." T. TASWELL-
LANOMEAD, supra note 20, at 391.
56. Id. at 413-15.
57. Id. at 378 n.55; see 3 How. ST. TR. 314-15 (1809).
58. H.L. JOUR. 223 (1668).
59. 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).
60. Id.
61. 13 How. ST. TR. 1370 (1686).
62. 9 A. GREY, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 81 (1763), quoted in Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1133.
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The case is discussed in detail by Reinstein and Silverglate. 63
Briefly, in 1686 Williams, the Speaker of the House of Commons, was
charged with seditious libel for publishing, by order of the Commons, a
narrative charging the Duke of York with involvement in a popish plot.
Williams pleaded parliamentary privilege as a bar to the jurisdiction of
the court. His counsel, Sir Robert Atkyns, argued at length that the
case was governed by lexparliamenti and not lex terrae (the common
law) because the greater court, Parliament, which gives law to the other
courts in the kingdom, could not in turn be judged by those inferior
courts.64 Atkyns averred that publication of such matters was part of
the informing function of Parliament.65 The court rejected this argu-
ment, and Williams was fined £10,000. In July of 1689 the Commons
resolved that the judgment was illegal,66 but the House of Lords de-
clined to reverse it.67
Reinstein and Silverglate make much of this case, and certainly its
impact on English constitutional law cannot be denied. Yet it must be
questioned whether the case had any impact on American constitu-
tional law. First, it is significant that the argument of Sir Robert
Atkyns was directed to the jurisdiction of the court. Atkyns claimed
that because Williams' actions occurred in Parliament, they were sim-
ply not governed by the law of the land in any way.68 But because
there is nothing comparable in this country to the high court of Parlia-
ment, and because the congressional privileges are specifically limited
by the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the American courts to deter-
mine whether activities in Congress are, or are not, privileged, has
never been denied. Thus, most of the impact of Williams' case is lost
on American law.69
63. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1127-31.
64. 13 How. ST. TR. at 1384; see C. Wirric, supra note 18, at 111.
65. 13 How. ST. TR. at 1418.
66. 10 H.C. JOUR. 21 (1689).
67. See 13 How. ST. TR. at 1434-42. It may be, as Reinstein and Silverglate point out, supra
note 6, at 1133 n.107, that this decision not to reverse was reached solely because the Lords did not
want to reimburse Williams. 13 How. ST. TR. at 1438-39. Holdsworth, however, is of the opinion
that Williams, in pleading that the court had no jurisdiction, presented a legally deficient claim.
In a case of seditious libel, the court prima facie has jurisdiction. The questions were, was Wil-
liams' narrative libelous and, if so, was it privileged; these are questions that the court had juris-
diction to decide. Thus Holdsworth, contrary to the comment in Howell, counts the Lords' refusal
to reverse as significant. 6 W. HOLDSWORaH, supra note 54, at 269-70.
68. C. McILwAn, supra note 24, at 243.
69. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1890). Atkyns' argument was that Parlia-
ment is governed by lexparliamenti rather than lex Ierrae. But because there is no equivalent to
lexparliamenti in this country, see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), Atkyns' argu-
ment has no application to American law. See generally C. McILwAIN, supra note 24, at 243.
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More important is the Bill of Rights provision to which Williams'
case gave rise. As noted, the Bill of Rights provides "that the freedom
of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament shall not be im-
peached."7 Reinstein and Silverglate recognize the significance of this
phrase, but they then ignore its omission from the American Constitu-
tion.7' British constitutional authorities, on the other hand, consider
the term "proceedings" to be the very heart of the privilege in Britain.
Thus, Halsburys' Laws of England provides that the term "proceed-
ings" includes not only "everything said or done by a member in the
exercise of his functions" both in committee and in the Houses of Par-
liament, but also "matters connected with or ancillary to the formal
transaction of business. 72 In the words of the Protestation of 1621,
Indeed, Holdsworth observes: "As was perhaps to be expected, [Atkyns'] argument unduly magni-
fies the privileges of Parliament, and it maintains that the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire
into their limitations." 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 515. Thus, despite the broad scope
of lexparliamentd in England, even the English consider Atkyns' arguments an overstatemenL
70. 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2 (1689)(emphasis added).
71. 'This provision was not by its terms confined to spoken words and could not have been
so intended consistent with the circumstances which led to its creation." Reinstein & Silvergiate,
.supra note 6, at 1130. For discussion of why the provision may have been omitted see text accom-
panying notes 82-95 infra.
72. 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 457-58 (3d ed. 1959).
Thus, in contradistinction to the rule in this country established in United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972), a press release by a member of the Canadian Parliament, which was an
"extension" of statements made in Parliament, was held to be privileged as a "proceeding" in
Parliament under the British speech or debate clause, which is applicable in Canada. Roman
Corp. v. Hudson's Bay Oil & Gas Co., 18 D.L.R.3d 134 (Ont. High Ct. of J.), a 'd, 23 D.L.R.3d
292 (Ont. Ct. App. 1972), aft'don other grounds, 36 D.L.R.3d 413 (Can. 1973). Similarly, in Brit-
ain, one Strauss, a Member of Parliament, wrote a letter to a Minister of the Crown concerning the
method of purchasing scrap metal by the London Electricity Board. Strauss had an interest in a
company that was involved in the sale of scrap metal. The Board threatened suit against Strauss
for libel based upon statements made in the letter. Strauss, however, complained to the Com-
mons, and on October 30, 1957, the Committee of Privilege concluded that Strauss' letter was a
"proceeding in Parliament" and that the Board had "acted in breach of the Privilege of Parlia-
ment" by threatening to sue. FIFTH REPORT FROM THE COMMIrTEE OF PRIVILEGEs, H.C. 305,
1956-57 Sess., § 20. Although the full house overruled this conclusion, legislation was passed out
of committee in 1977 that brings within the privilege "all things done or written between Members
and Ministers of the Crown for the purpose of enabling a Member to carry out his functions."
THiRD REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVILEGES, H.C. 417, 1976-77 Sess. This legislation is
contrary to the view expressed in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966).
Similarly, as Erskine May points out:
By insertion of the term "proceedings" in the Bill of Rights, Parliament gave statutory
authority to what was implied in previous declarations of the privilege of freedom of
speech by the Commons, e.g., in the Protestation of 1621 where it is claimed: "that in the
handling and proceeding of those businesses, every member of the House of Parliament
hath freedom of speech... [and] hath like freedom from all ... molestation.., for or
concerning any speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any matter or matters touching the
parliament, or parliament business."
A general idea of what the term covers is given in the Report of the Select Committee on
the Official Secrets Acts in session 1938-39: "It covers both the asking of a question and
the giving written notice of such questions, and includes everything said or done by a
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"proceedings" include "speaking, reasoning or declaring of any matter
or matters touching the Parliament or Parliament business. '73 Further-
more, it is established in Britain that: "The acceptance by any member
of either House of a bribe to influence him in his conduct as such Mem-
ber or of any fee, compensation or reward in connection with the pro-
motion or opposition to any bill . . . is a breach of privilege.
'74
Accordingly, acceptance of a bribe by a member is punishable only in
Parliament, not in the courts.75
As the foregoing description of the growth of the free speech privi-
lege in Parliament shows, until the time of the Williams' case, there had
been no claim nor serious expectation that "proceedings" in the House
were protected as well as speech.76 Thus, the inclusion of the term
"proceedings" in the Bill of Rights was not merely a reflection of Par-
liament's traditional view of its privilege;77 on the contrary, it was a
most notable expansion.71 It seems unlikely, therefore, that the Fram-
ers of the Constitution would simply have overlooked such a key term
in the Bill of Rights provision, which otherwise was copied almost ver-
batim in the Articles of Confederation, 79 and which thereafter was only
Member in the exercise of his functions as a member in a committee of either House in
the transaction of Parliamentary business."
T. ERSKINE MAY, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF PAR-
LIAMENT 142 (19th ed. 1976) (1st ed. London 1844). Erskine May goes on to observe that in Coffin
v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808), discussed in text accompanying notes 105-11, the American court was
able to give similar scope to a clause that did not include the "proceedings" phrase, but does not
indicate agreement or disagreement with this position. T. ERSKINE MAY, SUpra.
73. 1 H.C. JouR. 688, quotedin T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 357-58.
74. T. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 72.
75. Id. at 206. This view, of course, is contrary to the practice in the United States. United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 519 (1972). See also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445
(1965).
76. It is true that Eliot's Case, discussedin notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra, involved
acts in the House of Commons (holding the Speaker to his chair) as well as speech. Yet, as
Holdsworth points out, there was no error assigned to the court's assuming jurisdiction over the
charge of laying hands on the Speaker when the case was reversed in the House of Lords. 6 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 98 & n.9, 269 nA. See also Bradlaugh v. Gossett, 12 Q.B.D. 271,
284 (1884); T. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 72, at 90-91.
Even the Petition of Right states that "in the handling and proceeding of [business] every
member of the House of Parliament hath and of right ought to have freedom of speech to pro-
pound, treat, reason and bring to conclusion the same.' 3 Car. 1, c. 1 (1628), reprinted in T.
TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 20, at 370-72. The claim is not that all proceedings are pro-
tected but merely that freedom of speech in proceedings is protected-a considerably narrower
view of the privilege than was adopted in the Bill of Rights of 1689.
77. See C. MciLwA N, supra note 24, at 242-43.
78. See T. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 72.
79. Article V of the Articles of Confederation states: "Freedom of Speech and debate in
Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress ... ." U.S.
ART. OF CONFEDERATION art. V (1781). See also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177
(1966). Similarly, a preliminary draft of the Constitution reported by the "Committee of Five"
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slightly modified when molded into the current speech or debate
clause. Rather, it is more reasonable to assume that the phrase was
omitted for the purpose of narrowing the privilege. Since there was no
debate on this provision at either the Articles of Confederation conven-
tion80 or the constitutional convention," any argument must necessar-
ily be made by inference. Yet, an examination of the one hundred
years of English history between the Bill of Rights of 1689 and the
American Constitution of 1789 does shed some light on the subject.
Once its predominance had been established, Parliament pro-
ceeded to push its privileges to the extreme. The privilege from arrest
was extended to include the servants of members, regardless of what
crimes they might commit. Then, the members began issuing "protec-
tions," statements under seal declaring that the holder was a "servant"
of the member. Thus, anyone who could afford to purchase such a
document from a member was free from arrest.82 Similarly, any tres-
pass upon a member of Parliament, however unrelated to parliamen-
tary business, could result in the offender being hauled before
Parliament and forced to satisfy the member or face imprisonment.83
Nor were the problems of Parliament limited to overreaching. Corrup-
tion was rampant. "Votes which were no longer to be controlled by
fear, were purchased with gold."" Indeed, the practice of direct brib-
ery of members became an organized system in the mid-1700's: mem-
bers would stop by a pay office, established by the government, and
queue up to receive their wages of sin.85
contained the following provision: "Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall not be
impeached in any court or place out of the Legislature." J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 452 (1893 reprint) (n.p. 1840).
80. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1136 n.122.
81. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966).
The only signer of the Constitution to comment directly upon the speech or debate clause was
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, but his remarks, given in lectures at the University of Penn-
sylvania, do not deal with the intended scope of the clause:
In order to enable and encourage a member of the publick to discharge the publick trust
with firmness and success, it is indispensibly necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence.
2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 156 (Philadelphia 1804).
82. C. WiTTKE, supra note 18, at 41-42.
83. L. CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 535 (2d ed. 1866)(Boston 1856).
84. T. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 7, at 300.
85. "[A] shop was publicly opened at the Pay-office whither the members flocked, and
received the wages of their venality in bank-bills, even to so low a sum as two hundred
pounds for their votes on the treaty .... In a single fortnight a vast majority was
purchased to approve the peace... [ending the Seven Years' War]."
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In 1763 Parliament's abuses of privilege were thrust into the public
spotlight by the case of John Wilkes. Wilkes, a member of Parliament,
published a pamphlet called the "North Briton No. 45," in which he
labelled as false portions of a speech from the throne on the Peace of
1763.6 The Crown issued a general warrant for the arrest of everyone
involved in the publication, but Wilkes claimed his privilege from ar-
rest and was released by the courts. Parliament then declared that the
privilege did not extend to the case of writing and publishing seditious
libels,87 and Wilkes was expelled from the House of Commons. When
reelected, Wilkes was denied his seat by the Commons, which claimed
the sole right to determine the qualifications of its members, notwith-
standing the desires of the electorate.88 Wilkes' case became a cause
cblebre and was the subject of a great public outcry against parliamen-
tary overreaching.89
The American public, eager no doubt to latch on to any issue that
cast Parliament in a bad light, made Wilkes a national hero-a cham-
pion of free elections, freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, and
freedom of the press.9" It was in this atmosphere of great public reac-
tion against legislative corruption that the Framers began to consider
what powers would be invested in each of the three branches of govern-
ment. While it is true that none of the abuses discussed was directly
attributable to the free speech privilege, and none of the reservations
expressed by the Framers was applicable to that privilege, it is never-
theless clear that a rather narrow view of legislative privileges in gen-
eral was the order of the day.91
Thus, when it was proposed at the Constitutional Convention that
Id. at 254 (quoting H. WALPOLE, MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE THIRD 199
(London 1845)).
86. See C. WrrrKE, supra note 18, at 115.
87. Id. at 117; T. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 7, at 366.
88. C. WrrrKE, supra note 18, at 120.
89. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 191 (1957).
90. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 530 n.59 (1969). "'The reaction in America took on
significant proportions. Colonials tended to identify their cause with that of Wilkes. They saw
him as a popular hero and a Martyr to the struggle for liberty.... They named towns, counties
and even children in his honour."' Id. at 531 (quoting 11 L. GIPSON, THE BRITISH EMPIRE
BEFORE THE AMEFRCAN REVOLUTION 222 (1965)).
91. There was, however, a competing trend arising from the struggles of colonial legislatures
to be free from the dominance of British governors. The colonial assemblies typically asked for
the "usual" privilege afforded Parliament. M. CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE
AImEIcAN COLONIES 66 (1971). As in the days of the Tudors and Stuarts in England, however,
there were frequent clashes between the assemblies and the governors over how free the legislators
might be in their speech. Remarks critical of the governor were considered unacceptable. Id. at
94. See also id. at 84, 95-96. This clash, however, may reflect more the conflict between the
colonies and Great Britain than that between executives and legislatures in general.
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Congress should be the judge of its own qualifications, James Madison
was quick to offer arguments in opposition to the proposal:
Mr. Madison was opposed to this section as vesting an improper and
dangerous power in the legislature. The qualifications of electors
and elected were fundamental articles in a republican government,
and ought to be fixed by the constitution. If the legislature could
regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the constitu-
tion. . . Mr. Madison observed that the British Parliament pos-
sessed the power of regulating the qualifications both of the electors
and the elected; and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson wor-
thy of our attention. 9
2
Madison's view prevailed, and this power was not given to the Con-
gress.93 Similarly, the freedom from arrest was expressly limited to
members of Congress themselves; their servants and family members
were excluded.94
92. 3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 11, at 1285-86.
Similarly, in I THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 339-40 (J. Madison) (M. Walter Dunne ed. 1901),
Madison observed: "The legislative department is everywhere... drawing all power into its im-
petuous vortex." In the same vein, Jefferson wrote to Madison in 1789 that "[tihe tyranny of the
legislature is the most formidible dread at present and will be [so] for long years." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), quoted in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 375 n.4 (1950), reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 661 (J. Boyd ed. 1958).
See also note 11 and accompanying text supra.
93. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1968).
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. Jefferson, in his Manual ofParliamentary Practice, discusses the
"continually progressive" nature of the privilege of Parliament and notes that this limitation of the
arrest privilege reflects a reaction by the Framers against the "encroaching character of privilege."
T. JEFFERSON, supra note 46, at 15-16.
As to the speech or debate clause, Jefferson stated: "This is restrained to things done in the
House in a Parliamentary course. For he is not to have privilege contra moremparliamentarium,
to exceed the bounds and limits of his place and duty." Id. at 20 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
While not deciding whether the House could punish someone for contempt in a matter within
its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), that,
unlike the House of Commons, which has many judicial functions, the Congress has no general
power to punish for contempt and generally lacks thejudicatory characteristics of Parliament. Id.
at 197. In Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917), the Court held that the Congress had a
limited contempt power based on "the right of self preservation" to
prevent acts which in and of themselves inherently obstruct or prevent the discharge of
egislative duty or the refusal to do that which there is an inherent legislative power to
compel . ... [Tihe power, even when applied to subjects which justified its exercise, is
limited to imprisonment [that] may not be extended beyond the session of the body in
which the contempt occurred.
Id. at 542.
Since in the usual bribery case it could not be said that the members' activities would "inher-
ently obstruct or prevent the discharge of legislative duty," id., it seems fair to conclude that a
contempt prosecution in Congress for bribery of a congressman has been ruled out. Indeed, Con-
gress' own view of its punishment power under article I, § 5, is that it is limited to censure and
expulsion. RULES AND MANUAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIvEs, H.R. Doc. No. 663, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 63 (1977). Thus, in United States v. Brewster, the Court observed that "Congress
has shown little inclination to exert itself in this area." 408 U.S. 501, 519 (1972). The Court then
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Thus, it is simply unclear whether it was the intention of the Fram-
ers to give the same protection to congressional proceedings as is en-
joyed in Parliament, or whether the Framers intended to limit the
coverage strictly to speech and debate, excluding votes, committee ac-
tivities, addenda to the congressional record, and related activities. Al-
though the issue is certainly in doubt, the stronger argument would
seem to support a narrow view of the clause: 1) the clause by its terms is
narrow, covering only speech or debate; 2) a key phrase has been elimi-
nated from the broader British provision that served as the basis for the
American clause; 3) the constitutional history does not indicate an in-
tent to render the clause broader than its stated terms; and 4) the gen-
eral attitude of the Framers was one of suspicion toward broad
privileges in the legislative branch.95 No matter how accurate this ar-
gument may be, however, the American tradition for a broader general
scope of the clause is now firmly established and will probably remain
in effect. Nevertheless, the knowledge that the Framers may well have
intended a very limited scope for the free speech privilege should
leaven any tendency on the parts of modem courts and commentators
to adopt an expansive view of the speech or debate clause.
Even if it is not clear what the scope of the clause is, it is clear that
the Framers intended that bribery of a congressman, if it involves privi-
leged behavior, would be punishable in a formal proceeding, presuma-
bly, as in England, before the Congress itself. As Jefferson stated:
If an offence be committed by a member in the House, of which the
House has cognizance, it is an infringement of their right for any
person or court to take notice of it, till the House has punished the
offender or referred him to a due course.
* * * [O]ffenses [involving speeches in the House] have been se-
verely punished by calling the person to the bar to make submission,
committing him to the Tower, expelling the House &c.96
While in the early days of the country there was some inclination by
went on to discuss at some length why it was fitting to leave such matters to the courts. Id. at 519-
20. Finally, Congress' enactment of a bribery statute in 1853, Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 81, 10 Stat.
170, would seem to have finalized the issue. In the debates on that statute, it was apparent that
Congress felt it had no power to prosecute members of Congress for receiving money in exchange
for performing official acts. 30 CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 288-97 (1853). Accordingly,
Congress passed a statute providing for prosecution of such conduct in the federal courts.
95. On the other hand, even Queen Elizabeth was willing to allow free speech in the form of
votes. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
96. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 46, at 20-21. See also WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note
81, at 156; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 189-90 (1880) (indicating that, in certain cases
involving disorderly conduct or nonattendance, Congress may imprison its members).
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Congress to serve as a tribunal to try breaches of privilege such as brib-
ery (at least for nonmembers who tried to bribe congressmen),97 that
power has by now clearly been ceded to the normal processes of the
executive and judicial branches by statute98 and by Supreme Court
decision.99
Thus, since the original provisions of the speech or debate clause
were based upon the assumption that Congress would be able to try
breaches of privilege that, in accordance with British practice, would
not be cognizable in the courts,"° and since the trial and punishment of
bribed congressmen has now become the province of the courts, it fol-
lows that in a bribery case the evidence of speeches and debates, which
would have been admissible in a congressional trial, should be admissi-
ble in a judicial trial as well. Since Congress, unlike Parliament, claims
no power to try a congressman for bribery, the upshot is that under
current law the speech or debate clause has been rewritten to say that
"for any speech or debate [or vote, or proceeding or legislative act or
motivation concerning any of these] a Congressman shall not be ques-
tioned in any place."' 01 Surely the Framers, leery as they were of legis-
lative corruption, did not intend to provide corrupt congressmen with
such a convenient haven from the consequences of their venality.
II. EARLY CASE LAW
There is no historical authority for the position, which the
97. In 1795, Robert Randall and Charles Whitney were accused by members of the House of
having offered them bribes in connection with a proposed congressional grant of 20 million acres
of land in the Great Lakes area. Pursuant to a resolution, the Speaker issued a warrant and sent
the Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest the malefactors. The House found Randall guilty of contempt and
a breach of privilege and imprisoned him for nine days, after which time he was discharged upon
the payment of fees. DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO THE POWERS AND PRIVILEGES RE-
SPECTING THEIR MEMBERS AND OFFICERS, S. Misc. Doc. No. 278, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1894).
See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 543 n.l (1917), for examples of use of Congress' contempt
power.
98. By Act of January 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 1, 11 Stat. 155 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1976)),
Congress provided for the trial in a court of law of witnesses, called to testify before Congress,
whose behavior was contumacious.
99. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
100. It is still the law in England that it is not a crime, triable in the courts, for a member of
Parliament to receive a bribe. Rather, it is a breach of privilege, punishable only in Parliament
itself. T. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 72, at 142, 201; see Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act,
reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 231, §§ 1, 7 (3d ed. 1968) (setting forth the
British counterpart of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976)). See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,
188 (1957).
101. See generally United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169 (1966).
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Supreme Court has consistently maintained, that "the privilege should
be read broadly. . . to include not only 'words spoken in debate'...
but anything 'generally done in a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to the business before it,' "102 as well as the moti-
vations for such acts. Furthermore, an examination of the early Ameri-
can case law shows that despite some broad dicta, those cases lend little
support to the unduly expansive view of the privilege subsequently
taken by the Supreme Court in United States v. Johnson' and United
States v. Brewster.'04
The earliest case dealing with the legislative privilege of free
speech and debate is Coffin v. Coffin. 05 Coffin provided the base upon
which all later decisions were constructed."° The case involved a slan-
der suit between William Coffin and Micajah Coffin, the latter a mem-
ber of the Massachusetts House of Representatives.10 7 The case arose
when William Coffin, plaintiff, asked another house member, one Rus-
sell, to introduce certain legislation concerning notaries public for Nan-
tucket. Russell did so, the resolution passed, and the house moved on
to other matters. 08 At that point defendant, Micajah Coffin, walked
across the house floor and asked Russell from whom he had received
the information about Nantucket. Seeing plaintiff in the audience,
Russell indicated that it came from him, whereupon defendant ex-
claimed, "What, that convict?" and went on to assure Russell that
though William Coffin had been acquitted of some charge involving a
Nantucket bank, "It]hat did not make him the less guilty."'1 9 Plaintiff
sued and defendant pleaded legislative privilege under article XXI of
the Massachusetts Constitution, which provides in part that the state's
legislators shall have freedom of "deliberation, speech and debate.""10
102. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966) (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 204 (1880)).
103. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
104. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
105. 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
106. Johnson interpreted Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), and Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), as mandating a broad construction of the speech or debate privilege. 383
U.S. at 180. Tenney and Kilbourn had relied upon Coffn. 341 U.S. at 373-74; 103 U.S. at 203-04.
In Kilbourn, a unanimous Court declared that Coffin was "perhaps, the most authoritative case in
this country on the construction of [the speech or debate clause], and being so early after the
formation of the Constitution of the United States, is of much weight." Id. at 204. See also 408
U.S. at 513.
107. Coffin, and its inconsistencies, are discussed in detail in Celia, supra note 6, at 18-30.
108. 4 Mass. at 3-4.
109. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted).
110. MAss. CoNST. arl XXI, § 22.
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When the case came before the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Parsons declared for a unanimous court that
[Article XXI] ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the
full design of it may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering
an opinion, uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate, but will ex-
tend it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and
to every other act resulting from the nature and in the execution of
the office. And, I would define the article as securing to every mem-
ber exemption from prosecution for everything said or done by him
as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office,
without inquiring whether the exercise was regular according to the
rules of the House, or irregular and against their rules. I do not con-
fine the member to his place in the House; and I am satisfied that
there are cases in which he is entitled to this privilege when not
within the walls of the representative's chamber."'
In Kilbourn v. Thompson, n 2 an 1880 case involving the speech or
debate clause of the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court re-
lied upon the above passage from the Coffin opinion in holding that the
speaker and certain other members of the House of Representatives
could not be held liable for improperly ordering the arrest of a person
for contempt of Congress.' 13 The Kilbourn Court held:
The reason of the rule [the speech or debate privilege] is as forci-
ble in its application to written reports presented in [the House of
Representatives] by its Committees, to resolutions offered, which,
though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of
voting, whether it is done vocally or by passing between the tellers.
In short, to things generally done in a session of the House by one of
its members in relation to the business before it.114
The Kilbourn Court failed to note, however, that, having thus paid
lip service to a broad legislative privilege, the Coffin court went on to
conclude that Micajah Coffin was not "executing the duties of his of-
fice"" 5 in uttering the defamatory words, and that, consequently, he
could be found liable for his actions, even though the words spoken in
the house chamber were pertinent to business then pending before the
house." 6 Accordingly, Coffin would seem to stand for the proposition
that words not spoken in actual speech or debate may be the subject of
111. 4 Mass. at 27.
112. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
113. Id. at 203-04.
114. Id. at 204.
115. 4 Mass. at 30.
116. Although the resolution to appoint a new notary had been passed, the question who it
should be was yet to be considered. Id. at 4.
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legal action if they are defamatory (or, presumably, if they are moti-
vated by a bribe) since such words would never be "uttered in execut-
ing [the legislator's] official duty,"'1 7 a duty that was construed
narrowly by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.11 On the other hand,
the actions of the congressmen in Kilbourn, though misguided, were
carried out in good faith, pursuant to what the actors no doubt per-
ceived to be their legal duty. Therefore, it was entirely sensible to
shield them from liability.
Despite their adoption of the Coffin court's broad interpretation of
the legislative privilege, the Kilbourn Court did recognize that there
may be
things done [in Congress], of an extraordinary character, for which
the members who take part in the act may be held legally responsible
[such as the activities in the Long Parliament or the French Assem-
bly] .... [W]e are not prepared to say that such an utter perversion
of their powers to a criminalpurpose would be screened from punish-
ment by the constitutional provision for freedom of debate. X9
Thus, both Kilbourn and Coffin draw a distinction between acts done,
however wrongheadedly, in the pursuit of legislative duty and wrongful
acts done pursuant to some private motivation of the member in per-
version of legislative duty. These latter acts, even if covered by the
literal terms of the speech or debate clause, are not entitled to protec-
tion. Unfortunately, later courts have lost sight of this distinction.
Another eighty years of hibernation went by before the speech or
debate issue reemerged in Tenney v. Brandhove.12 ° Tenney involved a
suit under a federal civil rights statute against a California state legisla-
tor for summoning plaintiff to a hearing that was allegedly "not held
for a legislative purpose."1'' The Court held that the state legislative
privilege was on a parity with the federal privilege and that "[t]he claim
of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege.. . [because] it
[is] not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire
into the motives of legislators." '22 In other words, the Court could "not
117. Id. at 31.
118. Id.
119. 103 U.S. at 204-05 (emphasis added).
120. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
121. Id. at 371.
122. Id. at 377; see note 131 infra.
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go beyond the narrow confines of determining that a committee's in-
quiry may fairly be deemed within its province."'' 23 The Court con-
cluded by echoing the above quoted language from Kilbourn
concerning the possibility that a congressman could be held liable for
acts of an "extraordinary character."'124 Thus, again the Court was
dealing with ordinary legislative functions and not with the situation in
which a legislator has been indicted for perverting the legislative proc-
ess by receiving a bribe for the performance of an official act.
III. RECENT CASES
United States v. Johnson was the first criminal case involving the
speech or debate clause to come before the Court. In that case, charges
were brought against a Maryland congressman who had given a speech
in Congress that was favorable to certain independent savings and loan
institutions that, at the time, were under investigation by the Justice
Department. Johnson had also asked the Justice Department to "re-
view" the indictments of certain officials connected with these institu-
tions. 25 Johnson received substantial sums of money in exchange for
these activities. Subsequently, he was indicted and convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 371126 (conspiracy to defraud the United States) and former
18 U.S.C. § 281127 (conflict of interest).
At the trial, Johnson's speech was not admitted into evidence
against him. There was, however, "[e]xtensive questioning . . . con-
cerning how much of the speech was written by Johnson himself, how
much by his administrative assistant, and how much by outsiders rep-
resenting the loan company."'' 28 On cross-examination Johnson was
asked the reason for the inclusion of certain sentences in the speech. In
determining the propriety of this line of questioning, the Court, after
reviewing the early history of the speech or debate clause, cited Fletcher
v. Peck 129 and Tenney v. Brandhove for the proposition that" 'it [is] not
consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into
the motives of legislators.' "1 0
123. .341 U.S. at 378.
124. Id. at 378-79.
125. The Court had no trouble finding that the latter activity was "in no wise related to the
due functioning of the legislative process." 383 U.S. at 172.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
127. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 281, 62 Stat. 683 (repealed 1962).
128. 383 U.S. at 173.
129. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810).
130. 383 U.S. at 180 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 377).
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The reference to Fletcher v. Peck, however, was inapposite.
Fletcher stands only for the proposition that, if a statute is duly enacted
by a legislature following the proper procedures, the statute cannot be
annulled by a court on the grounds that the legislature was improperly
motivated. Fletcher does not in any way support the Court's assertion
that the motives of an individual congressman cannot be considered in
a criminal prosecution of that congressman.' 31 Having thus improperly
introduced the "motive" issue into the case, the Court supported its
position by referring to the nineteenth century British case, Ex parte
Waon.132 Again, this reliance was misplaced. Wason involved an al-
leged agreement by certain members of Parliament to deceive the
House of Lords by "mak[ing] statements which they knew to be un-
true." '3 3 In contradistinction to American law, such misconduct in
Parliament is not a crime, even if a bribe has been made. It is a breach
of privilege, punishable only by Parliament, 134 and therefore, the state-
ment from Wason is hardly surprising. Obviously, one cannot inquire
into the motives of Parliament's members in criminal proceedings if the
acts to which those motives gave rise cannot be made the subject of a
criminal prosecution. Thus, the holding in Wason that "the informa-
tion did only charge an agreement to make statements in the House of
Lords and therefore, did not charge an indictable offense"' 131 is clearly
inapplicable in this country.'3 6
131. The pertinent passage in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), is as follows:
It would be indecent, in the extreme, upon a private contract, between two individu-
als, to enter into an inquiry respecting the corruption of the sovereign power of a state. If
the title be plainly deduced from a legislative act, which the legislature might constitu-
tionally pass, if the act be clothed with all the requisite forms of a law, a court, sitting as
a court of law, cannot sustain a suit brought by one individual against another founded
on the allegation that the act is a nullity, in consequence of the impure motives which
influenced certain members of the legislature which passed the law.
Id. at 130.
The reference to Fletcher v. Peck in Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376, was more to the point because
Tenney involved a civil challenge to the members of a legislative committee for actions of the
committee rather than, as in Johnson, a claim that an individual member had acted to pervert the
legislative process.
132. L.R. 4 Q.B. 573 (1869), citedin 383 U.S. at 183. The Court in Johnson quoted the concur-
ring opinion of Justice Lush who stated that "'the motives or intentions of members of either
House cannot be inquired into by criminal proceedings with respect to anything they may do or
say in the House." 383 U.S. at 183 (quoting L.R. 4 Q.B. at 557 (concurring opinion)).
133. L.R. 4 Q.B. at 575.
134. See note 100 supra.
135. L.R. 4 Q.B. at 576.
136. The Supreme Court recognized this fact six years later in United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. at 518. While the Court in Brewster declared the "English analogy... inapt," it did not
make it clear that the exemption of members of Parliament from bribery prosecutions is not due to
the British version of the speech or debate clause per se, but simply because there is no statute
rendering such behavior criminal. Consequently, Wason is not a decision on the scope of the free
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Thus, while Johnson may have reached the correct result because
the Court was dealing with a broad statute that was not by its terms
applicable to congressmen, 137 it sowed the seeds of later confusion by
introducing for the first time, and totally without historical justification,
the notion that in the case of an individual congressman the speech or
debate clause encompasses not only "anything 'generally done in a ses-
sion of the House by one of its members in relation to the business
before it,' "38 but also the motivations for such activities. The Court
did indicate, however, that the result might be different if the prosecu-
tion of the congressman was "founded upon a narrowly drawn statute
passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative power to regulate
the conduct of its members," even though such a prosecution would
entail "inquiring into legislative acts and motivations."1 39
The Government accepted this proposal in United States v.
Brewster, only to be left standing at the altar by a vacillating Court.
Relying upon this dictum in Johnson, the Justice Department indicted
Senator Brewster under 18 U.S.C. § 201 for taking money in exchange
for his "action, vote and decision on postal rate legislation. . . pending
before him in his official capacity.""4 The district court dismissed the
indictment, holding that the speech or debate clause "constitutionally
shields [the Senator] from any prosecution for alleged bribery to per-
form a legislative act."'14 ' The Government appealed directly to the
Supreme Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 373 1.142 In its brief, the Gov-
ernment argued that 18 U.S.C. § 201 was the type of narrowly drawn
statute that the Court had referred to in Johnson.143
Although it appears from Justice Brennan's dissent that the Court
agreed to hear arguments in United States v. Brewster for the purpose
speech privilege, but merely a restatement of the obvious principle that if certain conduct has not
been made criminal one cannot be indicted for that conduct.
137. Johnson did not deal with the narrower conflict of interest statute. 383 U.S. at 185-86.
138. Id. at 179 (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. at 204).
139. Id. at 185.
"[Wlithout intimating any view thereon, we expressly leave open for consideration when
the case arises a prosecution which, though possibly entailing inquiry into legislative acts
or motivations, is founded upon a narrowly drawn statute passed by Congress in the
exercise of its legislative power to regulate the conduct of its members."
Id Johnson was a prosecution on the general charge of conspiracy to defraud the United States
under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). 383 U.S. at 171.
140. 408 U.S. at 502.
141; Id. at 504.
142. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 3731, 62 Stat. 683 (formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3731)
(amended 1971).
143. Brief for the United States at 10-33, United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). This
was the sole substantive argument made by the Government.
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of deciding the issue raised by the Government,1" a majority of the
Court was apparently unwilling to adopt the Government's position.
Instead, the Court skirted the issue by holding that the statute, 18
U.S.C. § 201,145 does not have anything to do with legislative acts.
The statute makes criminal the agreement to perform an official act in
return for money, regardless of whether the act is actually performed or
not. Since it would be possible to make out a case under the indictment
without proving any actual legislative acts, the Court held that the in-
dictment was improperly dismissed. 46
In addition to providing what seemed to be a neat loophole in the
speech or debate shield, the Court went on to point out that many acts
that are "related to the legislative process" are not protected legislative
acts. These include, "'errands' performed for constituents, the making
of appointments with government agencies, assistance in securing gov-
ernment contracts, preparing so-called 'news letters' to constituents,
news releases and speeches delivered outside the Congress."147 Never-
theless, the Court did hold that "the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits
inquiry only into those things generally said or done in the House or
the Senate in the performance of official duties and into the motivation
for those acts."'148
A contradiction is immediately apparent. If a Senator agrees to
take a bribe in return for introducing certain legislation, is not the bribe
the "motivation" for the legislative act?'4 9 By accepting the Johnson
rationale and excluding evidence of the "motivation" for legislative
acts as well as evidence of the acts themselvesthe Court rendered it
virtually impossible to gather the sort of evidence required to prove a
case that, necessarily, is frequently based upon fairly subtle shadings of
intent rather than on any overt display of criminality. For example,
144. 408 U.S. at 529. The position taken by the Court after reargument, see text accompany-
ing notes 145 & 146 infia, was not even suggested by the Government until its Supplemental
Memorandum on Reargument, dated March 1972, 10 months after the original Brief for the
United States: "Under this statute the crime consists of soliciting or receiving a bribe, with the
requisite intent, regardless of whether any official act is in fact thereafter performed. Thus the
offense could be committed without any speech or debate at all. Supplemental Memoran-
dum on Reargument for the United States at 4.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1976) provides that a member who "corruptly asks, demands, exacts,
solicits, seeks, accepts, receives or agrees to receive anything of value ... in return for. . . (I)
being influenced in his performance of any official act" is guilty of an offense.
146. 408 U.S. at 525-26.
147. Id. at 512.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. The Supreme Court apparently recognized this contradiction, but its explanation merely
dismisses the problem rather than solving it. id at 528.
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there is nothing wrong with a congressman receiving a substantial con-
tribution from the steel lobby, and there is nothing wrong with his
speaking and voting to exclude Japanese steel from the United States.
However, if he agrees to speak and vote against Japanese imports in
exchangefor the contribution, then he has violated the law. Assuming
that the congressman's speeches and votes cannot be used, the minimal
evidence necessary to prove the violation would be, in addition to the
evidence of payment, some evidence of an agreement. Frequently this
evidence would take the form of complicity by the lobbyists in the
preparation of the speech. Yet, such evidence, though extremely incul-
patory and in every sense evidence of acts destructive to, rather than
supportive of, the integrity of Congress, seems to be barred by the
Brewster decision,150 since the agreement or the bribe constitutes the
motivation for the legislative act. Contrary to the sentiments expressed
by Thomas Jefferson, the scope of the speech or debate clause has
now been extended to protect acts that are "contra morem
parliamentarium." 15
The Court's solution is fine if the congressman did not in fact per-
form the legislative act that he had been bribed to perform. Since no
legislative act occurred, the problem of what constituted the motivation
150. In United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3408
(U.S. Dec. 12, 1978) (No. 78-349), the Court of Appeals, in attempting to abide by the dictates of
Brewster, held:
Legislative acts may not be shown in evidence for any purpose in this prosecution.
Nor may the Government circumvent this clear requirement by introducing correspon-
dence and statements that though, not legislative acts themselves, contain reference to
past legislative acts of the defendant. To allow a showing by such secondary evidence
would render Brewster's absolute prohibition meaningless.
Id. at 522.
In United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1973), the Fourth Circuit went even further
and declared that the Government could not present evidence of Congressman Dowdy's contacts
with executive branch officials from whom he received documents relevant to a pending criminal
case. Even though Dowdy subsequently turned these documents over to defendant, the court
found that he could have received the documents "in preparation for a possible subcommittee
investigatory hearing." Id. at 224.
The court held that:
The [speech or debate] clause does not simply protect against inquiry into acts
which are manifestly legislative. In our view, it also forbids inquiry into acts which are
purportedly or apparently legislative, even to determine if they are legislative in fact.Once it was determined, as here, that the legislative fnction... was apparently being
performed, the propriety and the motivation for the action taken, as well as the details of
the acts performed, are immune from judicial inquiry.
Id. at 226. Thus, the motivation even for "apparent" legislative acts is barred from consideration
by the Fourth Circuit. To recall Jefferson's admonition in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice,
the "encroaching character of privilege," T. JEFFERSON, supra note 94, manages to make itself felt
even when the courts rather than Congress are the arbiters of its scope.
151. See T. JEFFERSON, quoted in note 94 supra.
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for such an act cannot arise. However, when a legislative act that is
motivated by the bribe is performed, then it becomes an impossible
task to prove either the bribe, the agreement to perform an official act,
or the circumstances surrounding that agreement without also proving
the motivations for the legislative act.152
Reinstein and Silverglate argue that the clause is an individual
privilege and that "Congress should not be able to divest any of its
members of the privilege by a statute authorizing prosecution in the
courts."'153 Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on this point,
the history of the clause in Britain makes it clear that exactly the oppo-
site conclusion must be reached: the clause was not designed to allow
for the unfettered expression of unpopular or minority viewpoints in
Parliament; on the contrary, it was designed to protect the majority,
and the constituents it represented, from intimidation by the Crown.
Parliament was not interested in encouraging dissenting views within
its own ranks."' The British courts have always maintained "that the
privilege of Parliament is the privilege of Parliament as a whole and
not the privilege in any individual member."' 55 It is clear that Parlia-
ment can, by express language in a statute, "annihilate" the privilege in
any given situation.156
The intent of the Framers of the United States Constitution was
the same. The clause served the basic purpose of protecting the powers
of the legislative branch from encroachment by the executive and judi-
ciary.157 It was not intended to protect the minority in Congress from
152. On the other hand, those persons who perform the seemingly less damaging acts of at-
tempting to influence the executive branch in exchange for pay may be readily prosecuted. Since
all legislative acts are oflicial acts, the broader the interpretation given to the term "legislative
acts," the narrower the statute's coverage becomes. Since there is nothing in the statute or its
legislative history to indicate that certain "official acts" are not within its ambit, it seems reason-
able to take Congress at its word and assume that the statute means what it says-that the receipt
of money in exchange for any official act is a violation. This eliminates the serious problem of
trying to discern which official acts are and which are not "legislative acts" because in most cases
it can be reasonably argued, see, e.g., Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1160, that most
official acts performed by a legislator can be considered to be legislative acts.
153. Id. at 1169-70.
154. For example, consider the case of John Wilkes, discussed in text accompanying note 86
supra.
155. Church of Scientology v. Johnson-Smith, I Q.B. 522, 528 (1972).
156. Duke of Newcastle v. Morris, 1870 L.R. 4 E. & I. App. 661, 671(1870); see Mummery,
The Privilege of Freedom of Speech in Parliament, 9 LAW Q. REv. 276 (1978). It is interesting to
note that Mummery cites Coffin v. Coffin for the proposition that the clause is an institutional one.
Id. at 288 n.72. Reinstein and Silverglate cite Cofli for the opposite conclusion. Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1170 n.277. While the Reinstein-Silverglate interpretation is probably
correct, Coffn is an ambiguous precedent at best. Compare 4 Mass. at 27 para. 1, with id para. 2.
157. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178-79.
1979]
NORTH C.AROLINA LAWREVIEW
the majority. Jefferson made it clear that "[t]he privilege of a Member
is the privilege of the House. If the Member waive it without leave, it is
a ground for punishing him, but cannot in effect waive the privilege of
the House."' 58 Thus, there is no historical support for the declaration
by Reinstein and Silverglate that "the privilege is guaranteed to each
member personally, and its constitutional protection is not subject to
collective discretion."'15 9
Reinstein and Silverglate suggest, however, that vesting such a
power in Congress could cause problems since Congress might "pass a
law proscribing all floor speeches which in any way criticize the gov-
ernment." 6 In Britain it is probably true that such a statute would not
violate the speech or debate clause.' 6 ' If, as its history suggests, the
purpose of the clause is to protect the independence of the legislative
branch,'62 then it follows that the clause cannot be invoked to overturn
duly enacted legislation even if that legislation limits the power of Con-
gress. The remedy for such admittedly unacceptable legislation must
be found elsewhere in the Constitution.
Since the speech or debate privilege in this country is constitu-
tional rather than statutory, however, it is not necessarily true that Con-
gress has the same power as Parliament to "annihilate" it.' 63 As
previously observed, though, the clause was not designed to protect a
member who acts "contra morem parliamentarium to exceed the
bounds and limits of his place and duty."' 164 If Congress were to make
it a crime for members to "speak out against any duly declared war,"
the courts could perhaps find that this activity was appropriate congres-
sional behavior that could not be prohibited and strike down the statute
under the speech or debate clause. On the other hand, the making of
speeches in exchange for bribes is not appropriate congressional behav-
ior, and consequently, Congress is not giving up any legitimate power
of its members by subjecting them to prosecution for such acts. Such
conduct has always been considered a breach of privilege and, there-
fore, prohibited. In Britain, Parliament itself may inquire into allega-
tions of bribery, and a member who is found guilty may be subjected to
imprisonment. In this country, the power to punish such behavior has
158. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 46, § 3, at 20.
159. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1169-70.
160. Id. at 1170.
161. See Duke of Newcastle v. Morris, L.R. 4 E. & I. App. 661 (1870).
162. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 501-06 (1969).
163. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-43 (1977).
164. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 46, at 136.
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been ceded to the executive. The passage of the bribery statute has in
no way limited the historic freedom of the legislature. Furthermore, if
the legislature is inclined to suppress minority viewpoints,165 it is much
more sensible to subject that inclination to scrutiny by the executive
and the courts, rather than to allow the power to exist unfettered in the
legislature.
While neither the bribery statute nor its legislative history contains
any express waiver of the privilege, 166 the statute does expressly include
congressmen within its scope. Furthermore, the debate on the original
statute makes clear that Congress did not believe that it had the power
to imprison its members for accepting bribes. Congress believed that
this power reposed entirely in the executive. 167 Since Congress was in-
viting the executive to protect Congress against corruption by its mem-
bers, it does not stand to reason that Congress would then withhold
from the executive the right to use the most significant evidence of that
corruption-evidence such as speeches, votes and debates, that would
unquestionably have been admissible had Congress tried the matter
itself.168
165. As, for instanot, the British Parliament was in Wilkes' case, discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 86-90 supra.
166. The record is silent and suggests that the issue was never considered. 30 CONG. GLOBE,
32d Cong., 2d Sess. 288-97 (1853). The original statute relating to bribery of Representatives or
Senators was § 6 of the Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 81, 10 Stat. 170. This read as follows:
Andbe itfurther enacted, That if any person or persons shall, directly or indirectly, prom-
ise, offer, or give, or cause or procure to be promised, offered, or given, any money,
goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward,... to any member of the Senate or
House of Representatives of the United States. . . with intent to influence his vote or
decision on any question, matter, cause, or proceeding which may then be pending, or
may by law, or under the Constitution of the United States, be brought before him in his
official capacity ... such person.., and the member, officer, or person who shall in
anywise accept or receive the same, or any part thereof, shall be liable to indictment as
for a high crime and misdemeanor in any court of the United States having jurisdiction
for the trial of crimes and misdemeanors; and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not
exceeding three times the amount so offered, promised, or given, and imprisoned in a
penitentiary not exceeding three years; and the person convicted of so accepting or re-
ceiving the same, or any part thereof, if an officer or person holding any such place of
trust or profit as aforesaid, shall forfeit his office or place; and any person so convicted
under this section shall forever be disqualified to hold any office, honor, or profit, under
the United States.
167. 30 CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 288-97 (1853).
168. United States Y. Johnson posed a different situation. In Johnson, though the congressman
had acted against the interests of Congress, he was charged under a general statute. Since the
charge of defrauding the United States conceiveably could be applied to conduct inimical to the
interests of the executive branch, and since Congress has not directly ceded to the executive the
power to deal with congressional misbehavior in that statute, the result in Johnson must be cor-
rect, even though the broad language of the holding was unwarranted.
If, as urged here, the protections of the speech or debate clause do not extend to prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203 (1976), what of grand jury investigations that may lead to such prose-
cutions? See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 623 (1971). An argument could be made that
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It might be argued that to allow the executive branch to thus ques-
tion legislative acts in the courts would have a great potential for abuse
because the Executive could use the statute to intimidate opposing con-
gressmen. Yet a determined and corrupt Executive could just as easily
bring a prosecution under the bribery statute as currently construed.
Since this article only advocates expanding the body of evidence ad-
missible in a bribery case and not broadening the definition of bribery,
the problem of abuse of prosecutorial discretion, which inheres in every
criminal statute, is not increased.
Moreover, no one would argue that congressional bribery should
go unpunished. The alternative to allowing the executive branch to
investigate and prosecute such matters is to allow Congress to handle
them itself. As the so-called "Koreagate" hearings of the House Com-
mittee on Standards of Official Conduct illustrate, however, this is an
inherently unsatisfactory method for bringing out the truth. That this
is so is less a reflection upon the particular members of this Congress
than it is upon the system of policing congressional misconduct. It is
unrealistic to expect members of a collegial body, who must daily com-
promise and cooperate with each other, and who were in any case cho-
sen on the basis of political popularity rather than moral uprightness,
to suddenly rear up and cast the stone of reprobation at colleagues who
have been caught doing what many of their putative inquisitors have
themselves been doing for years. It is only common sense to vest this
responsibility in a separate organization, be it a special prosecutor or
the executive branch.
Two further illustrations will help to reveal the seriousness of the
problems created by Brewster. Suppose a congressman receives
a necessary concomitant of the power to prosecute for bribery is the power to investigate those
matters that may become the subject of the prosecution. Yet, to give the executive the right to
subpoena a congressman before the grand jury and actually interrogate him concerning his legis-
lative acts (or force the assertion of the fifth amendment privilege) seems beyond the authority
delegated to the executive by the enactment of these criminal statutes. Most of the evidence in
question is a matter of public record and hence readily available for trial without the use of the
grand jury process. It is one thing for the executive to be able to make use of such material to
prove an indictment returned by a duly constituted grand jury. It is quite another to allow execu-
tive questioning of a congressman in a grand jury investigation that may never even lead to indict-
ment. (This reservation would not affect the subpoenaing of an ex-congressman's papers from a
library where they are stored, see note 170 infra, since such a subpoena is directed to the librarian
and consequently does not constitute a "questioning" of the congressman.) See Kaye, supra note
6, at 549. Of course, inquiry into motivations should be allowed in grand juries as well as trials
provided that the inquiry focuses on corrupt motivations rather than on the legitimate, although
perhaps ill-advised, reasons that might have caused a congressman to draft, or vote for, a certain
bill. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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$20,000 a year from a foreign government in exchange for his promo-
tion of that government's interest in the United States Congress. Peri-
odically, the congressman writes to the president of that country
explaining what he has been doing-making favorable speeches, voting
for military appropriations, lobbying with his colleagues and encourag-
ing executive branch officials to provide development funds for the
country. The Government seeks to use the letters against the congress-
man. While it is fairly clear that the letters themselves are not legisla-
tive acts,169 the letters discuss votes and speeches that are, and they
frequently contain evidence of the congressman's motivations to per-
form these legislative acts.170 Yet, the Brewster opinion states that
"news letters to constituents"17' are not covered by the privilege.
Brewster simply does not explain what is to be done if such letters, as
they usually do, refer to legislative acts or the motivations therefore.
Another situation that occurred frequently in the Korean investi-
gation was that a congressman, in the pay of the Korean government,
would approach another congressman on the House floor to urge him
to sign a pro-Korean petition or to vote for military or economic aid to
Korea. While such lobbying is undoubtedly a thing "generally done in
a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business
before it,' 72 it makes no sense to exclude evidence of this activity in a
bribery case since it is the strongest available evidence of the member's
efforts to subvert the operations of Congress. 173
The Supreme Court, however, seems to be leaning toward a nar-
rower view of the clause as the following passage from Gravel v. United
States illustrates:
169. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 623 (1971); United States v. Helstoski, 576
F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1978) (No. 78-349).
170. It was on this ground that the district court quashed a subpoena to a library for an ex-
congressman's letters in the Korean investigation. (The case is under seal and, therefore, cannot
be cited or discussed specifically.) See also United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1978) (No. 78-349).
171. 408 U.S. at 512. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. at 204, cited with approval in
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 509, 512, and United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179.
172. 383 U.S. at 179.
173. By imposing speech or debate limitations on the prosecution, Brewster seems to have
decided that 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) is not a "narrowly drawn statute" under which speech or
debate considerations may be waived, even though the Court purported to hold this issue open.
408 U.S. at 529 n.18. If, however, § 201 is not such a "narrowly drawn statute," it seems clear that
no statute currently on the books would qualify.
The real question is not how narrow or how broad the statute may be (and § 201 is a rather
broad statute), but rather what is the statute's intended coverage. By the express inclusion of
congressmen in the provisions of§ 201 and § 203 and the inclusion of all "official acts," Congress
has spoken with sufficient clarity on this issue, and the Court should recognize that fact.
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Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is
speech or debate in either House. Insofar as the Clause is construed
to reach other matters, they must be an integral part of the delibera-
tive and communicative processes by which members participate in
committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration
and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to
other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of
either House. As the Court of Appeals put it, the courts have ex-
tended the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate in ei-
ther House, but "only when necessary to prevent indirect impairment
of such deliberations." 174
While the Court is obviously painting with a much narrower brush
than in previous years, the application of such formulations to fact situ-
ations such as those discussed above is unclear. Certainly, conversa-
tions between congressmen on a pending vote are in general an integral
part of the deliberative and communicative process. On the other
hand, when such a conversation is corruptly motivated and in violation
of a statute, it is itself an impairment of the "due functioning of the
legislative process."' 17 This type of case is readily distinguishable from
cases such as Tenney v. Brandhove in which the acts challenged were
official in nature and carried out pursuant to what the legislators could
reasonably have perceived to be their due function.176 In short, the
Court found that the legislators were acting within the "sphere of legiti-
mate legislative activity."'177 Even though it may have the appearance
of being a normal legislative function, a speech, vote, conversation or
letter that is motivated by a bribe can never be within the "sphere of
legitimate legislative activity" because Congress itself has declared
such conduct illegal. 17
IV. CONCLUSION
The early history of the speech. or debate clause represented a
174. 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (Ist Cir. 1972)).
In Gravel, the Court allowed a grand jury to subpoena a Senator's aide to testify about the publi-
cation of the Pentagon Papers. The Court held that the publication had no connection with the
legislative process. See also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 513.
175. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172, discussed in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S.
at 513.
176. See also Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 506 (1975).
Eastland involved a first amendment challenge to a subpoena duces tecum issued by a duly con-
stituted congressional committee. The Court held that the issuance of the subpoena could not be
questioned in the courts.
177. 341 U.S. at 376. See also Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501
(1975).
178. See McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 888
(1977) (No. 76-1621).
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struggle on the part of the members of Parliament for the right to speak
out on the most basic issues affecting the realm without being jailed for
incurring the displeasure of the Crown. The practical scope of the par-
liamentary privilege of free speech depended upon the ebb and flow of
power between Parliament and the Crown and not upon any fixed and
immutable doctrine. Not until the mid-seventeenth century did it oc-
cur to anyone that anything more than actual speech might be covered
by the privilege. Finally, in 1689, the Bill of Rights established that
"speech and debate or proceedings in Parliament" were protected. The
"proceedings" phrase, considered by parliamentary authorities to be
the heart of the British privilege, was not, however, incorporated into
the American Constitution, perhaps due to disgust on the part of the
Framers with the massive abuse of privilege that had occurred in En-
gland in the hundred years between the Bill of Rights and the Constitu-
tional Convention. Whatever their specific intent may have been
regarding the speech or debate clause, it is beyond cavil that the Fram-
ers were fearful of legislative overreaching and sought to limit the priv-
ileges of the legislative branch and that the language of the speech or
debate clause is, by its terms, narrower than the British version.
Early cases, such as Coffin v. Coffin, seemed to recognize that the
speech or debate clause did not extend to individual criminal or slan-
derous conduct even if performed during the course of legislative busi-
ness. In United States v. Johnson, the United States Supreme Court
mistakenly relied on inapplicable British precedents and greatly ex-
tended the scope of the clause to protect not only criminal conduct per-
formed in relation to the business before the Congress, but also the
motivations for this conduct. United States v. Brewster, an obvious at-
tempt by the Court to cut back on Johnson, in some ways made matters
worse. While purporting to allow prosecutions based upon the agree-
ment to perform an official act in exchange for money, the Brewster
Court reaffirmed the holding in Johnson that motivations for legislative
acts are protected by the speech or debate clause. This holding created
an obvious dilemma because the agreement is the motivation.
In order to resolve this dilemma, the Court should recognize that
the enactment of a criminal statute that includes congressmen in its
coverage manifests an intent on the part of Congress to delegate to the
executive such power as Congress might have had to punish the crimi-
nal behavior regulated by the statute, Most important, the Court
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should recognize that the enactment of such a statute necessarily im-
plies that Congress has delegated to the executive the right to prosecute
congressmen for any of their activities that come within the scope of the
statute, whether or not the behavior in question constitutes a legislative
act.
